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Abstract. Denial of service attacks (DoS) can be defined as any event that reduces or eliminates a 
network’s capacity to perform its expected function. DoS is a common attack type because in most of 
time it only uses regular equipment and does not require high knowledge skills. In fact, there are sev-
eral standard techniques used in traditional computing to mitigate the effects of some of the more 
common denial of service techniques, although this is still an open problem to the network security 
community. The denial of service attacks is more expressive in smart object networks. First, because 
wireless sensor networks devices cannot support the computational overhead necessary to implement 
many of the typical defensive strategies. Second, small traffic rates are enough to drain node’s energy 
that makes the network inoperable. The denial of service attacks is even more alarming if the sensor 
networks support highly critical and sensitive services, such as fire detection and alarm. To realize the 
Internet of Things vision it is necessary to integrate the smart object networks into Internet. The inte-
gration of smart object networks in the Internet is considered an exceptional opportunity for Internet 
growth. However, it is also considered as security threat, because more attacks can be done, such as 
DoS attacks initiated from anywhere. For all these reasons, DoS attack is considered as a hot topic for 
WSN scientific community. The aim of this paper is to provide a solution based on 6LowPAN neigh-
bor discovery protocol to be supported only on edge routers to mitigate DoS and DDoS attack initiat-
ed from the Internet. 
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Low-Power Personal Area Networks, Denial of service at-
tacks, 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery, Internet of things. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, there is a growing tendency to embed computation and wireless communi-
cation devices on quotidian objects, transforming them in to smart objects. These ob-
jects will collect and process information from different sources to both control physical 
processes and to interact with human users [1]. The embedded computational and com-
munication devices are characterized by small size, power constrains, small computing 
and storage resources and by reduced radio ranges and throughput [3-3]. Several con-
nected smart objects are designated by low power over wireless personal area networks 
(LoWPAN). 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a subtype of smart objects network, where the devic-
es can interact with their environment by sensing and controlling physical parameters, 
such as temperature, humidity, and solar radiation. A single smart network may com-
prise hundreds of smart objects devices working together to accomplish a common task. 
Self-organization, fault-tolerance, and self-optimization are the main characteristics of 
smart object networks [2]. Actually, there are already many technologies that can be 
used to connect smart objects [3], most of them based on the standard IEEE 802.15.4 
layer two protocol [4]. Although, some of these technologies are proprietary, such as the 
ZigBee [5] and WirelessHART [6]. Moreover, these solutions are not compatible with 
IP protocol and consequently complex gateways are necessary to connect these net-
works to the Internet. In a near future, users can access the information collected by 
smart objects from the Internet, using regular devices and standard protocols. However, 
a new paradigm is necessary to enable smart objects to be accessed from the Internet 
where all the devices and networks are IP-enabled, independently of their physical and 
MAC layers protocols [1]. Supporting IP protocol in all smart devices will also simplify 
the application development because tools in use on regular computing for commission-
ing, configuring, managing, and debugging can be used or adapted. Initially, the scien-
tific community considered IP stack protocols too heavy to be supported by small power 
and resource-constrained devices. However, the scientific community and the industry 
started to rethink many misconceptions about the use of IP stack in all devices and now 
the IPv6 protocol is considered the most consensual solution to connect the smart ob-
jects to the Internet [7]. Nevertheless, IPv6 was not designed to be used in low power 
and resource constrained objects. The 6LoWPAN [8-9] adaptation layer was defined to 
be used between data link layer and network layer to permit the use of IPv6 protocol 
over IEEE 802.15.4 data link layer. To be used with 6LoWPAN other new protocols 
best fitted to low power and resource constrained devices were defined, such as routing 
and neighbor discovery protocols. In fact, the protocols designed to run over LoWPAN 
must have low overhead on data packets and on message exchange, minimal memory 
and computation requirements and support for sleeping nodes considering battery sav-
ings [8]. The neighbor discovery (ND) can be supported on the physical, data link or 
network layer; in this paper only ND network layer protocol will be considered. The 
neighbor discovery is one of the most important protocols, because it is used to the 
nodes on the same link to discover each other's presence, to determine each other's link-
layer addresses, to find routers and maintain reachability information about the paths to 
active neighbors [10].  
The IPv6 ND protocol was not designed for non-transitive wireless links. Moreover, it 
requires multicast transmission and the IEEE 802.15.4 only supports unicast and broad-
cast. As a consequence it is necessary to optimize the IPv6 ND to fits on LoWPAN. The 
adapted ND protocol supports sleeping hosts, eliminating multicast-based address reso-
lution for hosts, instead of defining a registration feature that, provides multi-hop prefix 
and header compression context and optional multi-hop duplicate address detection [10].  
Connecting smart objects networks to the Internet can be considered simultaneously 
an opportunity and a challenge. An opportunity, because more services can be provided. 
A challenge, because the smart object networks are now exposed to more security issues 
[11-13]. As a consequence more successful security attacks can now initiated from an-
ywhere. The security is even more alarming if the smart objects networks are used to 
support critical infrastructures, such as smart grids applications and fire detection. Sup-
porting security services on resource constrained devices is even more challenging, be-
cause of the overhead introduced. Denial of service and distributed denial of service can 
be done locally and remotely and is one of the most common security attack type, be-
cause usually it only requires regular and inexpensive resources and does not requires 
high technical skills [14]. This paper proposes a new mechanism to be supported only 
on edge routers, based on the neighbor discovery messages exchanged by the LoWPAN 
devices and the edge routers, to mitigate the denial and distributed denial of service at-
tacks remotely initiated. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the IPv6 enabled 
smart networks, while Section 3 focuses on security attacks for wireless sensors with 
IPv6 end-to-end connectivity support. The Sections 4 and 5 present a new countermeas-
ure mechanism based on 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery to mitigate network and 
transport layer DoS attacks remotely initiated and discuss their application. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper and pinpoints future research topics. 
2. IPv6 Enabled Smart Networks 
IEEE 802.15.4 [4] is a data link standard specified to address the low-power and low-
rate wireless personal area networks requirements. Two types of devices were defined: 
full-function devices (FFD) and reduced-function devices (RFD). FFD devices support 
all network functionalities, consequently can participate in peer-to-peer topologies be-
cause multi-hop communications are supported. RFD devices support a limited set of 
functionalities, they are mainly used in sensing and/or actuation operations. Multi-hop 
communications are not supported and, thus, they can only be used in star topologies.  
The protocol defines a central controller device, referred to PAN coordinator, which 
builds a WPAN with other compliant devices. The PAN coordinator starts a new net-
work by selecting a suitable channel according to energy detection scanning, which 
measures the interference of each channel. After the channel selection the PAN coordi-
nator broadcast periodically a beacon to announce the WPAN configurations. The other 
nodes start to listen the beacons to search for available WPAN and to select a coordina-
tor. Only full function devices can operate as a PAN coordinator. Two topologies are 
supported, the star topology network, where all communications must go through the 
PAN coordinator and the peer-to-peer topology, where devices can communicate with 
one another directly, but still the PAN coordinator must be present [15]. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol defines the physical (PHY) and the media access control 
(MAC) layers.  The PHY layer defines three physical operation modes, 20 kbps at 868 
MHz, 40 kbps at 915 MHz, and 250 kbps at 2.4 GHz (DSSS). The MAC layer provides 
two operational modes, the asynchronous beaconless and the synchronous beacon-
enabled mode. The beacon-enabled mode is designed to support the transmission of 
beacon packets between transmitter and receiver, providing synchronization among 
nodes. In the beacon-enabled mode, the PAN coordinator broadcasts a periodic beacon 
containing information about the PAN. In the beacon-enabled mode, the period between 
two consecutives beacons defines a superframe structure that is divided into 16 slots. 
Beacons always occupy the first slot, while the other slots are used for data communica-
tions. In these slots, slotted carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance 
(CSMA/CA) is used for data transmission. In order to support low-latency applications, 
the PAN coordinator can reserve one or more slots, designated by guaranteed time slots, 
which are assigned to devices running such applications (in this case, these devices do 
not need to use contention based medium access mechanisms) [16]. In the beaconless 
mode, there is no superframe structure and no guaranteed time slots. As a consequence, 
only random access methods, such as unslotted CSMA/CA can be used to medium ac-
cess. The frame length is limited to 127 bytes because unreliable and error prone wire-
less links are used and the devices have limited buffering capabilities.  
 
2.1. 6LoWPAN Adaptation Layer 
Currently, the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is widely accepted as the PHY and MAC layer 
protocol to be used on smart object networks. However, the WPAN constrains does not 
permit to support IPv6 directly over IEEE 802.15.4 [8]. The maximum link-layer packet 
size of 127 bytes is one of the most obvious limitations because implementing standard 
IPv6 headers over LoWPAN would result in extremely small payloads for higher-level 
protocols. In the best case, the maximum size of an IP packet is 88 bytes; the IPv6 
header has a minimum size of 40 bytes, which results in 48 bytes for upper-layer proto-
cols like TCP or UDP; the length of the TCP header is another 20 bytes, which results 
in 28 bytes available for the application-layer protocol (in the TCP case). The IETF cre-
ated the 6LoWPAN working group to define the support of IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4 
LoWPAN networks. In order to comply with the maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
requirements of IPv6 protocol and to minimize the overhead, 6LoWPAN [9] introduces 
an additional adaptation layer to be introduced between data link and network layers. 
This layer provides a mechanism for packet fragmentation, header compression, and 
support for data link layer forwarding of IP packets, also known as mesh-under routing. 
Although 6LoWPAN was originally designed to support IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4, it 
can later be adapted for other similar link technologies.  
In LoWPAN networks, packets will often have to use multiple radio hops to reach the 
destination. The multi-hop forwarding is motivated by the fact that the sending node 
may not have radio range to reach the destination node. To send a packet to another 
node, two main processes are involved: forwarding and routing. On the forwarding pro-
cess, packets are moved from the input to the output interface and are executed at lower 
layers. Note that in most of time, only one physical interface is involved in the forward-
ing process. Routing process can be executed at layer 2 or at layer 3. Routing process 
usually uses a routing protocol to evaluate the best path to reach the destination. Each 
node maintains a routing information base that contains all the information needed to 
run the routing protocol. The routing information base is used to fill the forwarding in-
formation base, which is consulted when a packet needs to be forwarded. Routing in a 
6LoWPAN network can be done in three different ways, link-layer mesh-under, 
6LoWPAN mesh-under, and route-over [17-18]. Link-layer mesh and LoWPAN mesh-
under are designated by mesh-under and are transparent to the network layer. Routing at 
network layer is designated by route-over.  
 
 A typical LoWPAN consists of edge routers, routers, and nodes (Figure 1). 
6LoWPAN nodes usually do sensing and actuation operations, they do not forward 
packets destined to other nodes. Routers are intermediate nodes that can be used to for-
ward datagram to others nodes or routers in the same LoWPAN and are present only in 
route-over topologies. Edge routers are used to connect the LoWPAN to others net-
works, for example, the Internet. Typically, only nodes and routers have energy and 
computational resources constrains, the edge router is main powered and has more 
computational resources [8]. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of 6LoWPAN network architecture. 
2.2. Neighbor Discovery Protocol for 6LoWPAN 
The IPv6 neighbor discovery protocol is used by the nodes on the same link to dis-
cover each other's presence, to determine each other's layer two addresses, to search 
routers, to maintain reachability information about the paths to active neighbors, and to 
address auto configuration [10, 19].  
The neighbor discovery protocol for IPv6 networks uses multicast to exchange most 
of the messages and it was designed considering the router and the nodes always on link. 
However, given the resource constraints of LoWPAN nodes, the absence of multicast 
support at layer two and the low duty-cycle, neighbor discovery on 6LoWPANs re-
quires a different approach focused on the efficient use of available energy. Although 
the standard IPv6 neighbor discovery protocol should work on 6LoWPANs, there are 
convincing reasons to optimize the neighbor discovery. In fact, the IPv6 neighbor dis-
covery protocol was not designed for non-transitive wireless links, making heavy use of 
multicast, which is inefficient and impractical in low-power networks, because broad-
cast is used in absence of multicast support. As a consequence, the rate of ND transmit-
ted messages is limited due to energy conservation policies. Also, IPv6 ND assumes 
that local link nodes are always a single hop away and nodes are always listening, but in 
LoWPANs that is not the case. 
Neighbor discovery optimizations for 6LoWPAN [10] are being proposed to address 
the specific needs of LoWPAN. Neighbor discovery optimization for low power and 
lossy networks (draft-ietf-6lowpan-nd-18) [10] is a work in progress specification pro-
posed by IETF's 6LoWPAN Working Group. It describes optimizations to the IPv6 
neighbor discovery, header compression context information dissemination, auto con-
figuration addressing mechanisms, and duplicate address detection for low power net-
works. The neighbor discovery signaling was simplified by replacing the address reso-
lution with address registration mechanism. It also eliminates the need for periodic rout-
er advertisement multicasting, by providing host-initiated request for router advertise-
ments. Moreover, in most cases multicast messages was replaced by unicast messages. 
The node to host interaction is not affected by the 6LoWPAN routing approach; as a 
consequence the interaction between this interaction is the same both in mesh-under and 
route-over. 
The edge router designated on draft-ietf-6lowpan-nd-18 [10] as 6LBR plays an im-
portant role in 6LoWPANs. Besides being responsible for connecting the LoWPAN to 
the Internet, it is also responsible for propagating the IPv6 prefix and header compres-
sion context information across the LoWPAN. The 6LBR also maintains a network-
wide cache of the hosts' IPv6 addresses and EUI-64 identifiers, which makes it able to 
make layer two address resolution and detect and avoid duplicate addresses. Alterna-
tively, DHCPv6 can be used to ensure unique addresses on the network. 6LoWPAN 
neighbor discovery assumes each IPv6 is derived from the unique EUI-64 address, so it 
does not require, by default, either duplicate-address detection or address resolution if 
the IPv6 link-local address are used [20]. There are also optional and separated mecha-
nisms that can be used between LoWPAN routers (6LR) and 6LBR to execute multi-
hop duplicate address detection and distribution. These optimizations lead to a signifi-
cant drop in signaling messages in the local network, resulting in significant energy 
savings, extending the longevity of the network. 
To achieve these goals, the new ND protocol defines three new ICMPv6 message op-
tions: the required Address Registration Option (ARO) and the optional Authoritative 
Border Router Option (ABRO), and 6LoWPAN Context Options (6CO). 
Two new ICMPv6 message types are also defined to carry out the optional multi-hop 
Duplicate Address Detection: Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and Duplicate Address 
Confirmation (DAC).  
The nodes in a LoWPAN use ND to perform address auto configuration, layer two ad-
dress resolution, neighbor unreachability detection, and to find default routers.  
When the interface on a node device is initialized, a link-local address is formed based 
on the EUI-64 identifier. Next, the device nodes send an RS message including the 
source link-layer address (SLLA), so that router can reply with a unicast RA message. 
The RA message can include the SLLA, ABRO, 6CO, and the IPv6 Prefix Option (PIO) 
(Figure 2). Once an address has been configured in a node, a NS with an address regis-
tration option will be sent to the edge router to register that address. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Host initiated router discovery. 
 
The process of address registration (Figure 3) is necessary to avoid the layer-two ad-
dress layer resolution based on multicast neighbor solicitation messages. The host sends 
a unicast NS message to the router, with the Address Registration option (ARO). The 
router replies with a unicast NA message with the ARO and the status of the registration. 
The status indicates either a successful registration or a failure due to a duplicated ad-
dress or because the router's registration cache is full. 
 
Figure 3. Node address registration. 
 
The address registration mechanism and the SLLA router advertisement option provide 
enough information in routers and nodes to resolve an IPv6 address and to its associated 
layer two addresses. Note that all prefixes, except the link-local addresses are always 
assumed to be off-link, so all communications must be through the edge router. The 
multicast addresses are also supposed to be off-link, because multicast-based addresses 
resolution between neighbors is not needed. The information transported on NA mes-
sages have a lifetime associated, before the lifetime expires the node must repeat above 
described process. Note that nodes can receive router advertisements messages from 
multiple edge routers. In this situation should attempt to register with more than one of 
them to increase the network resilience. 
The node device also uses neighbor solicitation messages to perform unreachability 
detection. This operation is mainly used to verify the default router reachability.  
The optional multi-hop duplicate address detection process is shown in Figure 4. It can 
be used in route-over networks to assure address uniqueness within the 6LoWPAN for 
non-EUI-64 based addresses. It is similar to the standard address registration process, 
except that as the edge router is responsible for managing the address registration cache, 
the intermediate router that the host tries to register with, must first check with the 
6LBR if the address is not a duplicate. This is done using the new DAR and DAC 
ICMPv6 messages. 
 
 
Figure 4. Host address registration with multi-hop DAD. 
 
An edge router does not need to send unsolicited router advertisement messages, be-
cause the node devices will send router solicitation messages whenever they need up-
dated information. Unicast neighbor advertisement messages are always used in re-
sponse to neighbor solicitation messages.  
 
2.3. Connectivity Models 
 
Three main models can be used to connect LoWPAN to the Internet. In this first de-
ployment model, all the LoWPAN nodes support IP stack, however, they are not con-
nected to the Internet [21]. In fact, there are several scenarios that do not require any 
connectivity with the Internet, for example the smart grid applications. Smart grid net-
works are used to monitoring the power generation networks, the automation and con-
trol devices, smart metering, and building and home energy management. These net-
works can also use the IP protocol suite in all nodes but due security and privacy rea-
sons in most of the cases are completely disconnected from the public Internet. In this 
case, supporting IP suite in all devices continues to be advantageous as described in the 
introduction, although assigning global IPv6 addresses to all devices is not desirable.  
In the second model, a proxy device is used to connect the smart network to the Inter-
net. Internet user will have access to the information provided by smart objects, such as 
environmental data, using the proxy device. The proxy can act as a server that collects 
data from the smart objects. This connectivity model can be used to connect networks 
without IP support, to preserve scarce resources on such networks and to increase scala-
bility, although it does not provide end-to-connectivity. Supporting more than one point 
of connection between the smart object network and the Internet could not be possible if 
the proxy uses stateful translation mechanisms. This connectivity model is similar to the 
previous model. So, the support of IP suite protocol continues to represent a benefit, but 
assigning IP global addresses to all devices is optional. The second model can be con-
sidered an intermediate model between the first model and the smart object full inte-
grated in the public Internet. 
In the third model (Figure 1), the smart object networks are considered as an exten-
sion to the Internet. This connectivity model can be used in a near future to support ser-
vices provided by smart cities, where the citizens can use the Internet to make quotidian 
decisions based on environmental data such as air quality, temperature, and real-time 
transportation information. All of these networks will make use of the IP protocol suite 
and one or more router could be used, for redundancy and scalability purposes, to con-
nect these networks to the Internet. In such model, the IP end-to-end connectivity is 
required and, at least, one IP global address must be assigned per device.  
3. Security Attacks for Wireless Sensors with IPv6 End-to-End Connectivity 
Support 
 
Protecting the resources and the information transmitted over the network from attacks 
is the main concern of the security services [11-13]. Besides the differences between 
smart object networks and the other network types, both share some security require-
ments. Despite this, due to resources constrains and the number of nodes, in smart ob-
ject networks providing security services is even more challenging when compared with 
regular networks. Confidentiality, integrity, availability, freshness, robustness, and sur-
vivability are the most relevant security requirements in smart objects networks [22-23, 
30]. Confidentiality requirement ensure that no other than the legitimate entities have 
access to the data transmitted and stored in smart object network. Authenticity is a cen-
tral concept to confidentiality, because it ensures that the identity of the sender is correct. 
Authentication is also necessary for automated node interactions. Integrity requirement 
is necessary to prevent that no message can be altered by any entity as it transverses 
from the sender to destination without being detected. The availability requirement is 
important to ensure that services provided by the smart object network are always avail-
able to be used by the legitimate users. Data freshness requirement is important to pre-
vent other parties to replaying old messages. There are two types of data freshness re-
quirements, strong and weak data freshness. In the first, it allows total order request-
response pair and allows delay estimation. In the second, a partial message ordering is 
provided, but delay estimation is not supported. Robustness and survivability must be 
ensured to guarantee the network still operational even if a set of nodes are compro-
mised due to security attack. Smart object networks are vulnerable to several types of 
security attacks, which can be classified, according to security requirements in three 
main groups [11]: attacks on secrecy and authentication, attacks on network availability, 
and stealthy attacks against service integrity. Eavesdropping, packet reply attacks, tam-
pering and spoofing of packets are examples of attacks against the secrecy and authen-
ticity. Several mechanisms can be used to prevent attacks on secrecy and authenticity, 
most of which based on cryptography. Device data confidentiality and integrity is hard-
er to obtain when compared with communication confidentiality because is requires 
both logical and physical measures to protect against attackers. Introduce false data into 
the smart object network is the main goal of stealthy attacks against service integrity. 
Attacks on network availability are often designated as denial of service attack. This 
paper focus on DoS and their countermeasures, in particular to those that can be used to 
prevent remote initiated attacks.  
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent the 
network to perform its expected functions [24]. During a DoS attack, the attacker at-
tempts to reduce the network’s capacity. Several events can be used to perform a DoS 
attack, flooding the network with junk traffic and disrupting network connections are 
two of the most common techniques. DoS attacks can be classified as logic attacks and 
resource exhaustion flooding attacks. Logic attacks exploit security vulnerabilities to 
cause a server or service to crash or significantly reduce performance. Resource exhaus-
tion flooding attacks cause the network node’s or network’s resources to be consumed 
to the point where the service is no longer responding or the response is significantly 
reduced [11]. When a DoS is originated from several sources it is designated by distrib-
uted denial of service (DDoS). On both types the attack sources can be locally or re-
motely located. In fact, there are several techniques that can be used to make a DoS se-
curity attack. The techniques that can be used to perform a DoS attack can be classified 
according to the protocol layer that is intended to attack [11, 24]. Jamming and tamper-
ing are the most common attack against the physical layer. The jamming is intended to 
interfere with the normal radio communication link. The attacker uses the same spec-
trum that legitimate network nodes are using. Defenses against jamming involve code 
spreading and frequency hop techniques. The link layer is responsible for medium ac-
cess control, error detection, frame construction and detection, and reliable point-to-
point and point-to-multipoint connections between adjacent nodes. Introduce collisions, 
is the main technique to perform a DoS attack on link layer protocols. Forcing collisions 
can be used to achieve resource exhaustion and unfairness. Using small frames, error-
correction codes and rate limitation are three of the most used mechanisms to mitigate 
layer two DoS attacks. In smart object networks the routing can be both performed on 
link layer (mesh-under approach) or at network layer (route-over approach), as conse-
quence DoS attacks directed to routing information protocols can pointed to both layers. 
Create loops, attracting or repelling network traffic from the selected nodes are the main 
objectives of DoS attack directed to routing protocols. Adding message authentication 
codes to routing information messages is one of the principal countermeasure technique, 
because the receivers can detect the sender identity and if the messages have been tam-
pered or spoofed [26-27]. Managing end-to-end connections is the transport layer main 
function, and flooding and desynchronization are two of the possible attacks in this lay-
er [11]. In flooding attacks, several new connection requests are sent until the exhaus-
tion of the receiver resources. To avoid this attack it is necessary to identify the legiti-
mate requests to avoid wasting resources with bogus connections. The 
desynchronization attack refers to the disruption of an existing connection. This attack 
uses spoofed messages causing the retransmission of missing frames due to error that 
never really existed.  
Puzzle resolution and authentication techniques are the most common countermeasures 
to prevent from transport layer DoS attacks [29-30]. Note that UDP protocol is most 
widely used in smart object networks than TCP, so apparently flooding and 
desynchronization attacks are not so disruptive. However, any unnecessary transmitted 
message has an important impact in the energy consumption and UDP is harder to con-
trol when end-to-end connections between the smart object and the Internet are support-
ed.  
DoS attack can also be directed to the application layer protocols. Application-layer 
DoS attacks are even more difficult to detect because the transport layer connection is 
valid and so are the requests. Application layer DoS attacks are even more difficult to 
detect because the transport layer connection is valid and so are the requests. During the 
attack one or more clients send a large number of requests. Legitimate request could be 
mixed with fake requests, which means a denying all philosophy will result in a DoS, 
situation that attackers are trying to force. Defending against application layer DoS at-
tacks usually involves some sort of rate-shaping algorithm that watches clients and en-
sures that they request no more than a configurable number requests per time period. If 
the client requests more than the configurable number, the client's IP address is black-
listed for a specified time period and subsequent requests are denied until the address 
has been released from the blacklist. The above-described countermeasures should be 
implemented on edge routers. First, the edge routers have more energy and computation 
resources than smart object nodes. Second, it makes more sense to filter the traffic clos-
est to the source.  
In the third connectivity model presented in Section 2.3 the smart object networks truly 
belong to the Internet just like any other network. Any Internet user, potentially, have 
access to the information provided by smart objects accessing the device. This connec-
tivity model can be used to support a myriad of new services and applications. However, 
the smart objects network becomes also exposed to remotely initiated security attacks, 
in particular to DoS and DDoS.  
4. A Solution to Mitigate DoS Attacks on WSN with IPv6 End-to-End Connectivity  
This section presents a new countermeasure mechanisms based on 6LoWPAN neighbor 
discovery to mitigate DoS and DDoS attacks remotely initiated. The new security 
mechanisms run only on the edge routers, not overloading the smart object nodes. Fur-
thermore, the proposed mechanisms reuse the registration address process messages. 
This mechanism protects against transport and application layer DoS and DDoS attacks, 
filtering unsupported traffic at the edge and rate-shape the requests from the Internet to 
ensure that any Internet client generate no more requests than the imposed limits.  
As explained in the Section 2.2, the address registration process is necessary to avoid 
the layer-two address layer resolution and to guarantee the node’s IP address uniqueness. 
According to routing approach two different procedures can be used to perform the ad-
dress registration [10]. In the mesh-under, the nodes exchange the address registration 
with the edge router. In the route-over, the process is similar to the used on mesh-under 
approach, but the nodes exchange the NS and the NA messages with an 6LR and the 
6LR uses the new Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and DAC ICMPv6 messages to 
verify the address uniqueness on the edge router.  
New information must be included on the Address Registration Option (ARO) and 
DAR address registration messages [10] to implement the proposed mechanism. So, the 
following information must be included on the ARO message: i) the transport-layer 
protocol accepted, ii) if the node accepts connections from the Internet, and iii) the max-
imum Internet clients request rate-shape limit. Then, new three fields must be defined 
for being transported on first ARO reserved field. In fact, the ARO option contains two 
fields reserved for future use, the first with 8 bits and the second with 16 bits length. 
The duplicated address messages also contain an 8bit length reserved field, which can 
be used to transport the same information. The figure 6 represents the new ARO and 
DAR message formats and Table I the valid values and the description for each new 
field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. New address registration option (ARO) and duplicate address request (DAR) message formats. 
 
 
 
Field Length Values Description 
Shape rate 4 bits 0000 Not used 
0001-1111 Rate limit value 
AFI 2 bits 00 Not used 
01 Do not Accept packets from 
the Internet 
10 Accept packets from the In-
ternet 
11 To be defined 
TP 2 bits 00 Not used 
01 UDP 
10 TCP 
11 Accept any 
Table I. Address registration option (ARO) and duplicate address request (DAR) new data fields. 
 
Three new data structures will be created at the edge routers, the filtering database, the 
Internet client’s address table, and the Internet client blacklist table. The filtering data-
base will be used to filter unwanted traffic and it is constituted by the node’s IP address 
(IP address) and registered lifetime (Lifetime). If the node accepts data from the Internet 
(Accept data from the Internet), the accepted transport layer protocol (Accepted 
transport layer protocol) and Internet client rate request limit (Rate request limit) (Fig-
ure 7). Information extracted from the new ARO and DAR messages are used to fill the 
filtering database, according to the correspondence defined in (Table II). 
 
Filtering database fields ARO message fields DAR message fields 
IP address (128 bits) EUI-64 Registered address 
Lifetime (16 bits) Registration lifetime Registration lifetime 
Accept data from Internet (2 
bits) 
Accept data from Internet Accept data from Internet 
Accepted transport layer pro-
tocol (2 bits) 
Accepted transport layer 
protocol 
Accepted transport layer 
protocol 
Rate request limit (4 bits) Rate request limit Rate request limit 
Table II. Filtering database fields correspondence. 
 The Internet client’s address table is used for ensure that any Internet client generate no 
more packets than the imposed limits. Limits per client and per node will be applied. As 
may be seen in Figure 8, this table is constituted by the Internet client IPv6 address 
(Client IP address), lifetime (Lifetime), smart object IP address (Destination address), 
the rate packet computed per minute (Rate request), and the rate request limit (Rate re-
quest limit) copied form the filtering database table. 
 
IP address 
(128 bits) 
Lifetime 
(16 bits) 
Accept data from the 
Internet 
(2 bits) 
Accepted transport 
layer protocol 
(2 bits) 
Rate request limit 
(4 bits) 
Figure 7. Filtering database table format. 
 
 The Internet client blacklist table is used to store the Internet client’s IP address that 
exceeds the imposed rate limits (Figure 9) and comprise the following fields: Internet 
client’s IP address (IP address), the configurable amount of time in seconds that the IP 
address must remains in the blacklist (Lifetime), IP address of the destination node (IP 
destination address), and the number of times that this address was added to the black-
list (Counter). The Lifetime value must be increased if the same client IP address re-
peats several times for the same or for different destination address. So, the blacklist 
table entries should not be removed after the lifetime goes to zero. However, periodical-
ly the oldest entries must be flushed.    
 
Client IP address 
(128 bits) 
Lifetime 
(16 bits) 
IP destination address 
(128 bits) 
Rate request 
(4 bits) 
Rate request limit 
(4 bits) 
Figure 8. Internet client address table. 
 
 
Client IP address 
(128 bits) 
Lifetime 
(16 bits) 
IP destination address 
(128 bits) 
Counter 
Figure 9. Internet client blacklist table. 
 
4.1. Mesh-under Networks 
In the mesh-under routing approach [11] nodes register the address directly on the edge 
router. When a node has configured a non-link local IPv6 address it registers that ad-
dress in one or more edge router, using the NS message with ARO option. Beyond the 
behavior defined in the 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery working progress document, the 
node also add to ARO information related to the new data fields (i.e., SR, AFI, and TP). 
If the values of the new data fields are equal to zero, the edge router handles neighbor 
solicitation message and the ARO option as specified in the 6LoWPAN neighbor dis-
covery working progress document Section 6.5. If the new data fields are different from 
zero and in addition to the normal behavior, the new data fields’ values are copied into 
the filtering database table according to the Table II. The edge router should ignore the 
new ARO fields if the new format is not supported. 
4.2. Route-over Networks 
In the route-over routing approach [11] the ARO can also be used to register an address 
in a 6LR (6LoWPAN router). In this situation, the 6LR reuses the information contained 
in the ARO, sent by the node, in the DAR message (Figure 4). So, in addiction to the 
normal operation defined in the 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery working progress doc-
ument the Section 8.2, the 6LR before send the DAR message must copy the new data 
fields (i.e., SR, AFI, and TP) from the ARO message into the new DAR message (Fig-
ure 6). The edge router updates the filtering database table according to the correspond-
ence defined in the Table II. The 6LR should ignore the new DAR fields if the new 
format is not supported. 
4.3. Filtering Packets Received from the Internet 
When the edge router receives a packet from the Internet destined to the smart objects 
network, before consulting the routing table, must verify if the destined address exists, 
if the destination node accepts the transport layer protocol in use, and if the packet IP 
source address is not present in the Internet client blacklist table with lifetime value 
greater than zero. The packet will be forwarded, using the regular routing mechanisms, 
if all the mentioned conditions are true. Otherwise, the packet will be discarded. Internet 
client´s address and Internet client blacklist tables will be actualized for each packet 
received from the Internet. 
5. Discussion  
Denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) can be done locally 
and remotely, and it is one of the most common security attack type, because usually it 
only requires regular and inexpensive resources, and does not requires high technical 
knowledge [11-13]. The frequency and sophistication of DoS and DDoS are rapidly 
increasing. To execute DoS and DDoS attacks several techniques are used, including 
direct attacks, remote controlled attacks, reflective attacks, worms, and viruses. 
There are several techniques that can be used to prevent or to mitigate DoS attacks alt-
hough a generic defense mechanism against to this security attacks is considered as an 
open issue. Furthermore, most of the proposed defense mechanisms require high com-
putational resources making them inappropriate to be used on smart object networks. 
DoS security attacks are even more destructive to smart object networks when com-
pared to the other networks. First, it is easier to exhaust resource on constrained net-
works. Second, a DoS can draw node’s energy making them unavailable until the attack 
is ended and the battery is recharged.  
This paper presents a solution to prevent from remotely initiated DoS network and 
transport layer attacks, filtering unwanted traffic originated on the Internet and destined 
to smart object networks nodes and it is based on address registration process defined in 
neighbor discovery protocol for 6LoWPAN. With this mechanism, only traffic that con-
forms to the following rules will be forwarded from the Internet into the smart object 
networks:  
 The destination node address must be registered; this condition is necessary to 
guarantee that only traffic destined to reachable node will be forwarded. 
 The nodes must manifest intention to accept data from the Internet; In fact, sev-
eral nodes, for example 6LoWPAN routers, are registered but do not make sense 
accept data from the Internet in most of the situations. 
 Information about the node’s supported transport protocol should be registered 
on the edge router; according to this condition only traffic transported over the 
supported protocol will be forwarded.  
 Nodes should inform the edge router about the accepted traffic rate limit; in fact, 
there are several slow variation in time physical processes which do not require 
high rate requests, for example air temperature monitoring. The traffic rate is 
computed for each client and for each destination address. 
 
To implement the proposed mechanism is necessary to add more three data fields to 
ARO and DAR messages. This modification does not increase the length of the messag-
es because the new fields use an existing eight-bit length reserved field. Moreover, it 
does not increase the overhead on the resource-constrained nodes (i.e. smart object 
nodes and 6LoWPAN routers) because the filtering mechanisms, all processing and 
storing overhead will be applied only on the edge routers, which have less resource con-
strains. The proposed mechanism uses stateless traffic processing, so it can runs simul-
taneously in different edge routers, providing more robustness to the network. In the 
original ARO and DAR messages the zeros are used to fill the reserved data fields, as a 
consequence less compression rates will be achieved on the new messages because dif-
ferent values will be used on the same fields [25].  
The security model used in the proposed mechanism can also be used to enforce securi-
ty services on the edge to provide confidentiality and authenticity based on cryptog-
raphy. Internet client authenticity must be ensured to provide a more robust remote DoS 
attack control. Authentication and client puzzles based mechanisms [13, 28-29] can be 
used in the edge router to provide a more coarse traffic admission control. Add authen-
tication, client puzzle mechanisms to the current solution and provide more application-
based control will be addressed as future work. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
Smart object networks, which include wireless sensor networks, can provide support for 
innumerous applications. In fact, the sensors give the smart objects the capacity to sense 
the physical world and to control some physical processes due to actuation capabilities. 
There are already a number of emerging applications of smart objects in power grid 
monitoring and control, e-health, intelligent transport systems, environmental monitor-
ing, and energy management. So far, the smart object networks are isolated from the 
Internet. First, a large number of technologies are used and some of them incompatible 
with IP protocol. Second, due to security reasons, most of the problems related with 
interconnection were already solved. However, providing security services in smart ob-
ject networks is considered as an open issue. Providing security in resource-constrained 
network is even more challenging when compared with regular networks. So, special 
protocols and mechanisms have been developed for use in smart object networks. The 
frequency and sophistication of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are rapidly increasing. 
This paper presented a security mechanism to prevent from remotely initiated transport 
level DoS attacks. The proposed mechanism filters at the edge router the traffic received 
from the Internet and destined to smart object nodes. The edge router only forwards the 
Internet traffic into the smart objects network if the traffic meets predefined conditions. 
In the proposed solution smart nodes uses an adapted version of 6LoWPAN neighbor 
address registration mechanism to inform the edge router about the conditions used to 
filter the Internet received traffic. In this mechanism, all the required information is car-
ried on address registration messages, the edge routers support storage and processing 
overhead. So, the new mechanism requires no more messages than those used to per-
form the address registration and also does not increase the length of the messages. 
Authentication and client puzzles based mechanisms can also be supported in the edge 
router to provide a more granular traffic admission control. Including these mechanisms 
and the performance evaluation in real scenarios, the proposed DoS attack prevention 
mechanism is addressed as a future work. 
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